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Abstract 
The Copy1ight Act 1994 inu·oduced moral rights into the New Zealand legal system. 
Moral rights arc a civil law concept and are aimed at protecting the link between a creator 
and his work. Throughout common law jurisdictions they are treated with a certain 
amount of misapprehension. This is reflected in the way in which they have been 
implemented. The level of protection granted is considerably lower than in civil law 
count1ies. The common law response has been to implement moral rights to the extent that 
they reflect existing common law remedies. This may be due to a poor grasp of the 
rationale underlying moral rights. The rights that have been implemented in common law 
countries differ in several respects from the traditional civil law concept of moral rights. 
This paper analyses the justifications for moral rights, and surveys approaches taken in 
other jurisdictions. This enables an assessment of the New Zealand Copyright Act. 
Deficiencies in the New Zealand approach are highlighted, and suggestions for reform 
made. 
The length of this paper 1s approximately 14,210 words excluding footnotes and 
bibliography. 
1 
I Introduction 
An artist created a statue for a village square. After several years the town decided to 
tear down the statue. Some time later the artist travelling through the area remarked to 
his companion on the uneven road surface. Closer inspection revealed that his statue had 
been dismantled and used for roading. Understandably aggrieved the artist sought 
enforcement of his moral rights. 1 At the opposite end of the scale is the example where 
an artist has erected a steel sculpture. It has corroded, and is regarded as an eyesore and 
a potential safety hazard. It is not possible to pull the structure down, to do so would 
violate the artist's right to have the integrity of his work respected.
2 This example 
represents the worst case scenario from a common law point of view. Few would deny 
that the artist in the first example should have a right to prevent or seek redress for what 
has happened. In the latter example, the artist's rights might be regarded as flying in the 
face of common sense. 
Moral rights are either an established part of a country's legal system or are regarded as 
an unwelcome parvenu. Common law countries heralded the introduction of moral rights 
with suspicion. Civil law jurisdictions have a moral rights tradition and give a higher 
degree of protection. New Zealand included moral rights provisions for the first time, in 
the Copyright Act 1994 to fulfil obligations to the Berne Convention. The level of 
understanding of moral rights is poor. The term "droit moral" is a faux ami and causes 
confusion and misapprehension. Such an expansive system of personality rights was 
viewed with mistrust. The French system of moral rights is held out by commentators as 
the ultimate model of moral rights protection. However, even the French Intellectual 
Property Code does not require the level of protection that has been implemented by the 
French courts.3 There is no reason why the French model of moral rights should be 
1 Example based on Sudre v Commune de Baixas l l 936 I DP.III.57. 
2 Based on an anecdotal case in Grenoble, France. 
3 See W. Strauss ""111e Moral Right ol'the Author'' (l 955) 4 American Journal of Comparative Law 506, at 516 a
nd 
535. 
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preferred over any other. The German system has as long a lineage, but a slightly 
different jurisprudential basis. 
The common law approach to moral rights varies. Common law countries have responded 
to the perceived threat by implementing limited rights. The United States has enacted sui 
generis moral rights legislation.4 Another approach is to formulate sui generis exceptions.5 
Gerald Dworkin suggests that a key to reconciling difficulties may lie in allowing different 
levels of moral rights protection for certain works such as computer programs and 
databases. 6 Another alternative is to allow waiver of moral rights. The fundamental 
question is the extent to which this should be regulated. Dworkin voices concern at the 
possibility of authors being able to enforce moral rights in a way that benefits their 
economic interests by subterfuge. However, he concedes that authors' rights are in need of 
protection given the power imbalance frequently present m the 
author/publisher/commissioner menage a trois. 7 
This paper will evaluate the justifications for, and means of implementing the range of 
moral rights. The different rationalisations for moral rights protection and the ways in 
which moral rights have been incorporated in various common law systems will be 
explored. Common law approaches will be compared with more traditional moral rights 
systems to determine where the differences lie. The New Zealand Copyright Act 1994 
purports to grant moral rights, but the legislation is deficient in several respects. The 
paper will analyse deficiencies in common law approaches to moral rights and suggest 
alternative ways to define moral rights and apportion the benefits, rights and duties 
between creators and utilisers. 
4 As in the United Slates. 
5 As is frequently the case with regard to computer programs. 
6G. Dworkin "Moral Rights and the Common Law Cmmtries" ( 1994) S Australian Intellectua l Property Journal S, at 
35. 
7 In thi s paper the words creator and author are !used interchangeably. Unless specified to the contrary, \,here 
abstract reference is made to a person, U1e male form shall be taken as including the female. 
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II What are moral rights? 
There is no single definition of moral rights, each jurisdiction varies the rights to suit its 
legal, economic and social background. Moral rights evolved from the civil law system. 
They are a creature of judicial invention as opposed to being statutorily derived . There are 
two fundamentally divergent views of moral rights, the "dualist" theory favoured by the 
French, and the "monist" theory underlying German moral rights. The French dualist 
approach considers moral rights to be totally separate from economic rights. The German 
monist approach regards moral and economic rights as being interdependent, both rights 
expiring at the same time. The Berne Convention sets out basic rights that should be 
recognised in moral rights provisions. It does not require that moral rights be implemented 
by specific legislation. It is argued by common law countries that moral rights are 
recognised and already provided for by existing legal remedies, such as consumer 
protection legislation and common law remedies. 
8 Other countries are keen to limit the 
scope of authors ' rights, fearing that increased protection for creators will necessarily lead 
to increased costs of expression.9 This paper outlines the approaches to moral rights in 
various jurisdictions. 
The first text of the Berne Convention did not recognise the existence of moral rights. 
· Mounting pressure from a number of countries, including France, Italy and Belgium 
culminated in the inclusion of limited moral rights provisions in the 1928 Convention. 
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention recognises the right to attribution and integrity 
rights in more limited scope than the French approach. 
10 The rights of divulgation and 
withdrawal are not included in the Convention. Even in countries with a strong moral 
right tradition the right of withdrawal is more notional than real. The Berne Convention 
8 See M. Wyburn "TI1e Attorney-General's Department's Moral Rights Discussion Paper: Background an
d 
Proposals" ( 1995) 23 Australian Business Law Review 3 l 8 at 326. 
9 Common law countries. 
l O See Appendix I. 
does not require that the rights must be inalienable. 11 This is largely a result of pressure 
from the United States which was reluctant to recognise moral rights and especially 
reluctant to do so where such rights would be inalienable. The Berne Convention does 
not prohibit a waiver of moral rights, so long as the waiver is explicit, and is not 
purported to be effected by an assignment of the economic rights to the work. 12· The 
following categories are deemed in various jurisdictions to be components of moral 
rights. 
• Right of Attribution 
The right of attribution gives the author the right to assert paternity with respect to the 
work. The reverse side is the "negative" right to non attribution. 
• Right of Disclosure 
The right of divulgation allows the author to decide when the work is to be released for 
publication. 13 The decision should not be pre-empted by another person. 14 Non 
disclosure has been described as one of the most economically significant privileges 
involved in copyright. 15 After the initial disclosure the owner's privileges to decide not to 
use or license the work may be overridden by the Court as it seeks to facilitate the widest 
possible dissemination "in the public's interest". If this right is important in the broader 
. intellectual property context, the same can be said of moral rights. Of all the moral rights, 
this is perhaps the best recognised in common law. 
11 Unlike WIPO which states: "[m)ost of the copyright laws recognise moral rights a an inalienable part of the 
copyright, distinct from the so-called economic rights".WIPO Glossary ofTenns of the Law of Copyright and 
Neighouring Rights 16l, WIPO Publ. No. 827 (EFR)(Jan l 1981 ). 
12 A. Lat.man, RA Gonnan, JC Ginsburg Copyright for the Nineties 1992 Cumulative Supplement, 3 ed, The Michie 
Company, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1992, at 161. 
13 Sa linger v Random House 81 l F2d 90(2d Cir, 1987) is an example of how this right has been applied. 
14 See R. Sarraute "Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law" ( l 968) 16 
American Joumal of Comparative Law 465, at 467. 
15 See W . J . Gordon "An Inquiry into the Merits ofCopyright:TI1e Challenges ofConsistancy, Consent, and 
Encouragement TI1eory" ( 1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1343, al 1390. 
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• Right of Integrity 
The right of integrity confirms the author's right to have their work respected. The right 
of integrity in France is perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible. It can be made the 
subject of a testamentary disposition. 
• Right of Withdrawal and Mod~fi,cation 
The right of withdrawal and modification allows the author has a right to retract the 
work after publication has taken place. This may be subject to the proviso that the author 
compensates the other contracting party who may suffer harm. The right of modification 
and withdrawal exists in various guises in France, Germany and Italy but not in common 
law jurisdictions.16 
• Droit de Suite17 
In some countries droit de suite is considered to be a moral right. 18 It allows the author to 
follow the economic success of their work by giving the creator the right to a percentage 
of the resale profits if the work is sold at public auction or through a dealer. The droit de 
suite rewards creativity, and also redresses the power imbalance between publishers and 
creators. It is acknowledged to a significant extent in the German concept of 
Nachfolf?ezwecksubertraK1,tnf? (the right to follow the proceeds from the work) .19 The 
United Kingdom rejected the droit de suite as being too impractical to implement. 20 In the 
United States § 24 of the Copyright Act 1909 provided a right of renewal once the initial 
copyright term has expired, giving a second remunerative bite. 21 The terms of the Act still 
apply retrospectively to some older copyright works. The right of renewal did not vest 
until the end of the original term of copyright. If the author died before this and had 
purported to assign the right of renewal to someone else that part of the assignment would 
l6 Above n 14, at 476. 
17 Article 14 Berne Convention provides for droit de suite. 
18 For example France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Norway. 
19 TI1e so called "best seller paragraph". Art 26 URIIG 1965. 
20United Kingdom Green Paper 1981 , at 55. 
21 Stewart v Abend 110 Set 1750, L Ed 2d 184 (S Ct I 990). 
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be invalid and the right would vest with the executors.22 The debate about retrospectivity 
and extension of the copyright term continues in the United States. 
A Moral Rights and Property Rights 
Hohfeldian theory defines property as a bundle of rights.23 The rights express the 
relationship between the property and those who control it . This theory gives a person a 
"claim right" against others. This theory is equally applicable to intellectual property. 
Copyright describes the relationship between the creator and their right to exploit the 
potential of the creation. It also describes the subsequent relationship between the creator 
and the person to whom the economic rights of exploitation are transferred. Moral rights, 
focus on the intimate connection between the creator and their creation. The 
interrelationship between intellectual property rights and moral rights requires analysis. A 
reason why common law systems have such difficulty accepting and rationalising moral 
rights may be because our system of property rights differ conceptually from the European 
model. If this theory is true, a paradigm shift may be necessary to facilitate the 
introduction and acceptance of moral rights. Common law property rights traditionally 
focus on the physical, more concrete elements of property law. Intellectual property law is 
one of a number of exceptions to this. The basis for intellectual property law is hard to 
discern. Commentators generally focus attention on the economic aspects of copyright. 
Jeremy Waldron, favours adopting a rights based approach to property rights.24 The 
question is whether there is an individual interest which is sufficiently important from a 
moral point of view to justify holding people to a duty to promote it. The same logic can 
be applied to moral rights. 
22 Derivative works complicate the situation and are a legal issue in their own right. Derivative works created under 
a grant from the author will be valid and can be used during the extended term of copyright while other derivative 
works based on the grant made during the renewed term will not be valid. 
23 For a general discussion of property rights see Gordon above 11 15 . 
24 See generally J. Waldron The Right to Private Property Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988. 
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Jn recent years in New Zealand there has been an effort to accommodate different 
concepts of property ownership. Most educated citizens would acknowledge the existence 
of communal ownership of resources. There is greater recognition of indigenous people' s 
intellectual property rights. The concept of a spouse having rights over the other spouse' s 
future earnings reflects a shift in our concept of property. It does not require a quantum 
leap to move towards incorporation of moral rights into the New Zealand legal system. 
B Civil Law Systems 
Civil law systems have a longer tradition of moral rights. There are two main approaches 
to moral rights, the German monist system and the French dualist system. Comish 
stresses, however, that both countries have placed moral rights in a high position, the -, 
moral rights being essential and the economic rights consequential. Moral rights comprise 
as a bundle of rights including attribution rights, integrity rights and the right of disclosure 
and withdrawal/repentance, depending on the jurisdiction. Moral rights as a rule cannot be 
waived. The concept of waivability makes moral rights more acceptable to common law 
countries, but potentially poses the greatest threat to the more traditional European 
concepts of moral rights. 
1 France 
France describes its system of moral rights as being dualist. 25 The philosophy centers 
around two parallel strands of moral rights. One is the economic right, "le droit 
patrimonial", the other "le droit moral". The moral right is a personality right which 
attaches to the author and ranks above the economic rights .26 It is perpetual , inalienable 
~d indefeasible.27 Economic rights are treated as an extension of the moral rights of the 
author rather than as an independent right. The moral right comprises the right to 
25 For a general discussion of French moral rights see Y.L. Sage "The French In tellectual Property Code 1992- ·111e 
Author ' s Rights of Disclosure and of Reconsideration" ( l 995) mimeo. 
26 Article L. 121- l lntellectual Property Code. 
27 Art 6 French lntellectual Property Code. 
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attribution28, the right to have the integrity of the work respected29, the right of 
disclosure30 and the right to reconsideration. 3 1 
The author has positive and negative rights of attribution. The author has absolute 
discretion to decide if and when the work should be released to the public.32 In some cases 
the Court may be asked to ascertain whether there were conduct or circumstances 
indicating an intention to disclose the work. The Camoin case illustrates the approach to 
the right of disclosure.33 The artist, Camoin had thrown away paintings which he regarded 
as unsatisfactory. These were subsequently found and sold at auction. When he became 
aware of this, he ordered that the paintings be destroyed. The Cour de cassation held that 
the author alone has the right to determine disclosure of the work. 34 Delivery up and 
destruction of the works was ordered by the Court. If the Camoin case were tried in a 
common law jurisdiction the same result would probably be reached. The right of 
disclosure is fairly well established in our system, as copyright is awarded to the first 
creator. 
Where an author enters into a comm1ss1on, the author assumes the responsibility of 
creating the work and disclosing it. If the author genuinely feels that he is unable to create 
the work he intended to create he may still choose not to disclose the work. The author 
would, however have to compensate the owner or commissioner of the work. The Court 
may require evidence as to the genuineness of the author' s belief that the work could not 
be created. Salon d 'Ete is a variation on the usual case scenario where the author wishes 
to exercise his right of non-disclosure. 35 The artist Dubuffet was commissioned by Renault 
28 Art Art 6. 
29 Art 6. 
JO Art 19. 
3 1 Art32. 
32 Tius is similar in common law countries. 
33 Camoin v Carco D.P 1928.2.89, Gu.Pal. 1931 1.678 
34 For a further discussion see A. Francon; J. Ginsburg "J\uthors ' Rights in France: The Moral Right of the Creator of 
a Commissioned Work to Compel the Comnussioning Party to Complete the Work" ( l 985) 9 Columbia VLA 
Journal of Art and the Law 381, at 387 ff 
35Dubujfet Trib.gr.inst. Paris 23 mar, 1972 . 
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to create a sculpture for the entrance to their main buildings. Work commenced but an 
unforeseen cost blowout and anticipated high maintenance costs led Renault to decide not 
to continue with the project. Dubuffet offered to pay the difference between the price 
increase and the cost blowout, in order to complete the work but Renault remained 
unconvinced. Dubuffet petitioned the court of first instance to enforce the contract but his 
application was denied. On appeal the Court held that the artist is guaranteed the right of 
disclosure, by cancelling the contract Renault had denied the artist this right. This 
approach is significant in that the author was seeking to enforce a positive right of 
disclosure. 
An author who has transferred his exploitation rights retains a right to reconsider or 
retract the work as he sees fit. 36 The extent ofreconsideration permissible is determined by 
reference to the contract. The author cannot require a complete retransfer of the work. 
Reconsideration can take place prior to the publication of the work, or during the course 
of exploitation of the work. The author who elects to exercise the right of reconsideration 
must compensate the copyright holder for any prejudice that the retraction or alteration 
may cause. If the author who retracted the work wishes to publish again the previous 
publisher must be offered the opportunity to publish the work on the same terms as 
previously. There is a right of integrity that extends to protect the author from excessive 
criticism. This approach was rejected in Germany, where the usual rules of libel and 
slander apply to such circumstances. 
French moral rights allow authors of collaborative works to retain the rights of an 
individual in respect of the work. Audiovisual works constitute an exception to this rule 
and are regarded as purely collaborative works, the parties involved are treated as co-
authors. If a co-author refuses to complete his portion of the work he cannot demand that 
the other authors do not use the work that he has already completed. For an audiovisual 
work to be complete a master copy must be approved by all the parties involved. Any 
changes or alterations to the final work require the approval of all the collaborators. 
36 See Whistler v Eden DI] 1898.2.465, S 1900.2.201 where the work was nei ther published nor released. 
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The French Intellectual Property Code establishes a hierarchy of successors to the author's 
moral rights. The executors are first in the line followed by the surviving spouse and other 
heirs. The executors are curators of the author' s memory and are responsible for 
maintaining the integrity of the author's work. Should a problem arise the Code permits a 
judge to intervene, to ascertain the intention of the author, and if necessary make 
modifications to the agreement to facilitate the "correct usage" of the author's work. 
Theoretically the moral right in France is not waivable. The right is considered to be such 
an integral part of the author' s personality that it is impossible for her to divest herself of 
that right. In France the moral right has a higher level of protection than the economic 
rights. However, it has been subdivided to enable the exercise of the rights by successors 
and can be assigned into trusteeship. French courts do not accept that there can be an 
implied waiver of the moral right, but in the case of collective works the author may not 
unreasonably refuse to consent to a change in the work. Common law looks askance at the 
scope and extent of French moral rights, fearing that they are untenable in practise. 
2 Germany 
Germany asserts the interdependence of moral and economic rights. The two strands are in 
a sense complimentary. While the economic rights focus more on the end result of creative 
endeavour, moral rights focus on the creative process. Eugen Ulmer describes the 
interrelationship in the following way: 37 
Copyright/authors ' rights derive from the great idea of intellectual property which is common to all 
Europe. Today this idea has its importance as, being founded on natural law, it draws attention to 
the element of equity which is inherent in copyright. No doubt, unlike a material good, a work is 
not only attributed to the author for the purpose of its economic exploitation, but is also attached to 
him as a child of his spirit. . .I believe, in particular, that the constitutional guarantee of property 
applies to copyright. The Basic Law of Bonn guarantees property. In constitutional language, that 
means that inteJlectual property is also guaranteed-copyright in its component parts consisting both 
of patrimonial and moral rights. 
37 E. U1mcr "Lettre d 'Allernagne", 1957 "Le Droit d 'A u1eur" 16. 
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The Basic Law is Germany' s founding constitutional document. All other legislation is 
subordinate to the overriding principles in the Basic Law. In 1954 the Federal Supreme 
Court affirmed that the Basic Law provided everyone with the right to free development 
of his or her personality. This applies to intellectual property law and to the moral rights 
especially. The German approach attempts to balance the public interest in the 
dissemination of culture and information with the stimulation of creativity. This approach 
centres around the auctorial myth and the creative process rather than the creative result. 
This philosophy was expressed succinctly by De Boor: 38 
[I]f we wish to protect the creative personality, it is not sufficient to provide him with a financial 
reward for his work. Rather personal and cultural interests should be put first. 
Moral rights are viewed as part of the author' s exploitative right. 39 These rights are 
strengthened by the Basic Law protection of personality. The author has the right of 
disclosure, 40 the right of attribution and the right to prevent distortion or 
misrepresentation which would endanger the artist ' s intellectual and personal interests in 
the work. 41 There is no requirement that there be harm to reputation. It is the work and 
the artist's connection to it which is the important factor. The moral right is not 
transferable but changes may be authorised by contract.42 The author can authorise others 
to exercise the right on his behalf 43 The author does not lose his rights by doing this, he 
merely devolves them for certain purposes. The copyright transferee may not modify the 
work without the permission of the author, but the author may only prevent modification 
in good faith. 
38 G. Davies C'opyrigla and the Public Interest VCTI, Weinheim, 1994 , al 11 5. 
39 Alfred Gierke was the main proponent of this position. 
40 The right of disclosure has been recognised for some time W1der contract law provisions in the Civil Code rather 
U1an as a moral right principle. 79 RGZ 156, 11 0 RGZ 275, 11 2 RGZ 173. 
4 1 See Appendix 2. 
42 LUG § 9( 1); KUG § 12( 1). 
43 Eugen Ulmer gives the example of an author granting the publi sher the right to prevent other U1eatre companies 
from staging work of his that has been mutilated or distorted in some \\ ay. Chapter E. Ulmer "Germany-(Federal 
Republic )"in S.M . Stewart lnlem ational Copy right and Neighbouring Rights 13utterworths, London, 1983. 
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Of the French and German systems of moral rights, the French system is the more 
extensive and radical. The German system is tied to notions of personality but can equally 
be expressed as a form of property right, since the two rights are intertwined. The monist 
explanation for the basis of moral rights is less well known in other jurisdictions, but may 
be more acceptable to common law countries. The system is more flexible and allows 
rationalisation either from a property or a personality rights based approach 
III Rationale and Justifications for Moral Rights 
-
A question raised in this paper is the extent to which moral rights exist within the existing 
body of law and how moral rights can be strengthened in our legal system. One of the 
traditional justifications for granting intellectual property rights is that it encourages 
incremental development. This is beneficial to society. There is however a difference 
between human creativity which is boundless, and limitations imposed by the physical 
science. Creators who seek patent rights must deal with the latter limitations. As a result 
of this they are rewarded a monopoly greater than that which is conferred by copyright. 
Although no direct economic interest is conferred by moral rights economics can 
influence moral rights. The economic aspects of intellectual property protection are a 
"structural variant" on the rules that comprise the system of intellectual property rights, 
while moral rights are a "positional variant" on these rules. 44 The economic aspects are 
results driven, whereas the moral rights aspects are process driven. Moral rights exclude 
economic rights and could be regarded as a lesser species of right from a commercial point 
of view. Cost is frequently cited as a reason why moral rights should not be granted or 
should be waived. This is a specious argument, similar to justifying failure to obtain an 
easement by claiming that you could have bought one, but you thought that the other 
party was charging too much. 45 It is revealing that in the intellectual property realm we are 
44 For a discussion on the concepts of positional and stmctural variants of mles shaping intellectual property see H. M. Spector "An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights" (1989) 8 EIPR 270. 
45 S.L Carter "Does it Matter whether Intellectual Property is Property?" ( 1993) 68 Chicago Kent Law Review 715 at 718. 
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reluctant to allow market forces to decide what the value of the property is. We expect 
creators to be more altruistic than doctors or manufacturers. 
A The Authorial Myth 
The theory of the author is central to an analysis of copyright and moral rights. 46 The 
advent of moral rights coincides with the growth of theories about the role of the author 
in relation to their work. Some commentators are sceptical about the way in which the 
authorial concept has been mythologised in copyright law. 47 Moral rights are largely a 
Romantic construct which regards a work as being intrinsically connected to the author 
and deserving of protection as an extension of their personality. 48 It was conceived of as 
a measure of the creative genius of the author and was valued according to its degree of 
creativity. This highly authocentric approach lasted until the advent of modernism in the 
first half of the twentieth century. 49 A popular theory is that copyright evolved to protect 
authors and to encourage creativity. 50 A more likely hypothesis is that copyright 
protection evolved to safeguard the interests of publishers. 
During the Renaissance authors were supported by wealthy patrons and the Church. The 
author was thought of as being a craftsperson, and if he was particularly gifted, as being 
inspired by a muse. This is illustrated by the claims of Martha Woodmansee who notes 
that creativity was conceived of as deriving from outside of the author. 51 The writer is a 
channel for creativity. This is illustrated by the teachings of Martin Luther who preached 
that all knowledge is God given and therefore should be disseminated freely. The 
46 For a comprehensive discussion on t11e roles of printers and autl1ors sec B. Shcnnan and S. Strowe! cd Of Authot:Y and Origins Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. 
47 P. Jaszi "Toward a Theory of Copyright:TI1c Metamorphoses of Auiliorship" ( 1991 ) 40 Duke Law Journal 455 , at 459. 
48 Sec C Aide "/\ More Comprehensive Soul:Romantic Conceptions of Authorship and tl1e Copyright Doctrine of Moral Right" (1990)48 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 211 , at 214 ff 
49 R.11 Rotstein "Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringment and ilic Fiction ofilie Work" (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 725, at 733. 
5o Je a protection-incentive model of intellectual property. 
51 M. Woodmansee "The Genius and the Copyright" (1989) I O Eighteenili Century Studies 425 , at 427. 
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eighteenth century wrought a change in this perspective. Inspiration was regarded as a 
talent which had its basis in and derived from the author. Rather than being the recipient 
of universal or theistic wisdom; the creator impressed his imprint on the work. This shift 
in emphasis was discussed by Edward Young who wrote in 1759 that originality was the 
main feature of a writer' s genius. 52 Young' s essay received relatively scant attention in 
Britain but was published and widely distributed in Germany. Goethe, Herder, Kant and 
Fichte built upon this rudimentary philosophy. It was uncommon for writers to make a 
living out of the proceeds of sales of their works. This prompted Beaumarchais to 
comment that: 53 
In theatre foyers, people say that it is not noble for authors who seek fame to fight for their 
everyday needs. Tt is true that fame has its appeal, but people forget that nature has condemned us 
to have lunch 365 times so that we can enjoy the fame for a year. 
At the end of the seventeenth century as patronage declined writers began to receive 
honoraria form publishers. Honoraria were not regarded as wages but were more a 
recognition of the authors ' achievements, the sums involved were modest. There was a 
flat rate which took no account of an author' s subsequent success. There was little 
economic incentive to create. Publishers rewarded authors of scientific texts with 
honoraria, but it was uncommon for poets to receive or accept such payment. 
Tension between authors and publishers arose when authors began to perceive that 
publishers were benefiting disproportionately at the expense of authors, a theme that 
continues to this day. The sea was not all plainsailing for publishers of the era either. 
There was no statutory copyright protection and publishers were having their markets 
undercut by pirates. The book privilege was a solution designed to assist publishers. 
States developed copyright protection largely at the insistence of the mercantile class 
which demanded a more certain return on their investment. It would be misleading to say 
that the publishers had a high initial outlay. The benefits that authors obtained were more 
52 E. Young Conjectures on Original Composition.E Morely e<l; Manchester 19 18 
53 Quoted in Copy right-Documents in Politics and Society in the Federal Republic o/Ge,many Inter Nationes e. V., Bonn, 1990, at S. 
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esoteric than commercial in nature. Publishers claimed that the value in books lay in the 
copies of the books themselves. Authors countered that the value and integrity in books 
lay in the inherent qualities and ideas underlying the work and in the creation of the 
author. Protection for authors evolved from a back door approach to moral rights. A 
groundswell of moral support for the plight of the Romantic author emerged. 
The authorial concept remams and has formed central part of the moral rights 
philosophy. Authors rarely retain control over their economic rights. What remains are 
moral rights. Beaumarchais' comment about the plight of authors may still hold a grain 
of truth. Now that authors may eat, attention turns to Beaumarchais' "fame" element; the 
more esoteric areas of endeavour requiring attention. 54 
B Locke's Property Theory 
Moral rights can be justified both as a personality and a property right. A justification for 
intellectual property protection is that it simultaneously provides a reward for creativity 
and a stimulus for further creativity. John Locke formulated a theory justifying why 
property rights should be protected.55 This theory of property rights parallels Luke 10:7 
which justifies reward. 56 Locke formulates this in the following way: 
[E]vcry man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The 
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Locke' s theory provides an interesting justification for intellectual property rights. Locke' s 
Second Treatise on Government focuses on the property right of an individual in the 
labour of their own body. The appropriation of an unowned object by the application of 
human labour is acceptable where it does not impair the position of another. The 
requirement that there be a symmetry of interests presupposes that protection will only be 
54 Post structural literary prompted Michel Foucault to proclaim the death of the author. This is yet to aITect copyright. 
55 See S. Stromholm A Short History of Legal Thinking in the West Norstcdts Forlag AB, Stockholm, 1985. 
56 "[Flor the labourer is worthy of his hire". 
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granted to those things that are socially beneficial. On what basis therefore does a person 
deserve to have powers or rights above others? There are three basic explanations. 57 
1. Public response to excellence deserving of merit. 
2. Reciprocal exchange. 
3. Response to specifically human needs. 
Western society values excellence of creativity. Influenced by Lockean theory it is 
thought that labourers are deserving of reward . Kase claims that the Berne Convention 
has its ideological basis in a Lockean justification for property ownership. 58 The extent to 
which we still rely on Lockean philosophy can be inferred from Justice O'Connor's 
remarks in Feist v Rural Telegraph Co where she stated that copyright should only 
protect works which :59 
are original and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be 
protected are the fruits of intellectual labour. 
In expressing this formulation the judge favours individuated authorship. It is simplistic to 
say that the sole motivation for creativity is financial reward. Altruistic principles are 
involved .60 
[A]uthors and inventors deserve a reward for their labour and should be given it regardless of 
whether they would continue their work in the absence of compensation . 
57 
See L. Becker "Deserving to Own One' s Intellectual Property" ( 1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 609. 
58 
F.J. Kase Copy right Though! in Conlinenlal Europe F.B Rothman & Co, South Ilackensack NJ, 1967, at 9. 
59 1 I I Set 1282 (10 Cir I 991 ). 
60 Above n I 5, at 1448. 
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C Hegelian Theory of Personality 
Hegelian philosophy centres around the connection between the full development of the 
human personality with acts of appropriation.61 This philosophy questions the Lockean 
approach which rewards creativity with protection. Utilitarian arguments focus on the 
consequences of creativity, not on that which stimulates it. 62 Lockean theory rationalises 
that if no one suffers harm by rewarding creators with rights, there can be no reason to 
object to rewarding creators with such rights. At first glance the Hegelian approach 
appears to be better aligned with the dualist concept of moral rights. Hegelian philosophy 
says that labourers are dependant on their products. The products we produce are 
connected to our identity as individuals. The welfare of the product is therefore 
connected to our welfare as persons. There is an identity interdependence between the 
work and the individual. This concept is developed and expanded on by Becker.63 
Identity-dependence on the products of one 's intellectual labour is generated and sustained by lhe 
social norms that identify human excellence with authorship, originality, and singularity, and 
which encourage the author-identification of products· 
This further creates a risk for the creator as:64 
[S]ocial norms that create incentive for productive intellectual labour also imperil the labourers 
who may become identity-dependant on the products of their labour. 
Wendy Gordon justifies this by saying that dominion over property can be justified as an 
outgrowth of rights over one' s self 65 Gordon 's formulation blends of Lockean and 
Hegelian justifications for property rights. This could be regarded as a valid explanation 
6 1 
It is also a fom1 of natural law. For a general discussion of natura l la"' see L.L. Weinreb "Natural Law and Rights" 
in RP.George ed Natural Law The0ty, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992. 
62 
Utilitarianism is set out in R. Dworkin Low 's Empire Fontana, London, 1986. 
63 Above 11 57 , at 627. 
64 Above n 57, at 627. 
65 Above n 15, a l 1388. 
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of the status of moral rights. Lockean theory focuses on the investment of labour as 
being the justification for property rights . 
The French system classifies moral rights as a personality right. The connection between 
the author and the work is paramount. Common law countries are more hesitant and place 
emphasis on the economic rights. Keith Aoki and Gerald Dworkin both regard moral 
rights as potentially a double reward for creativity.66 Moral rights can be classified and 
justified either as a form of incorporeal property or as a personality right with limits. There 
is precedent in the common law system for this and it may facilitate understanding of how 
moral rights can operate. Better understanding of other schemes of moral rights can help 
to clear up misapprehension. 
D Who should bear the Cost of Moral Rights? 
A common complaint is that allowing moral rights protection will impose an additional 
cost, above that of copyright. An analysis of who is best able to bear the risk and who 
should do so on policy grounds should be carried out. In a situation where no moral rights 
are recognised, the author bears the risk. Where there is only partial or sui generis moral 
rights legislation and an expectation that rights will be waived, only the most successful 
artists will have a chance of enforcing their moral rights. In Stephen King' s world there 
may well be equality of bargaining power. He is free to assess the value of his moral rights. 
It would be reasonable to assume that few creators are fortunate enough to possess such 
bargaining status. 
The only way that the majority of authors benefit from moral rights protection is by having 
unwaivable provisions.67 Jeffrey Dine points out that tort law attempts to place the cost on 
66 K. Aoki "Adrift in U1e Intertext:Auil10rship and Audience "Recoding Rights" ( 1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
805 and above n 7. 
67 See J.M. Dine "Authors Moral Rights in Non-European Nations:International Agreements, Economics, Mannu 
Bhandari, and the Dead Sea Scroll s" ( 1995) 16 Michigan Journal of International La\\ 545, at 580. Note pagination 
from Wcstlaw database. Original page numbers may vary. 
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the least cost risk avoider, and that this approach should also apply to moral rights. 68 This 
proposition is problematic. As can be imagined there may be cases where it is desirable to 
allow waiver. A rusting sculpture that poses a safety risk should be able to be removed. 
And yet it is also true to say that the author should not be the one to bear the cost and risk 
of the copyright transaction. 
IV Implementation 
A Moral Rights in the International Setting 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) forms 
part of the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations. GA TT members must extend to other 
member states protection that is at least equivalent to that provided in the Berne 
Convention, the Paris Convention69, the Rome Convention70 and the Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. 71 It is also required that intellectual property is 
given most favoured nation treatment. However a specific exception was made in the case 
of the Berne Convention. Member states do not have to comply with the provisions of 
Article 6 bis. This was the result of a specific demand from the United States. The Berne 
Convention is excluded from the TRIPS dispute resolution process. Moral rights have a 
tenuous position in international law. 
B How is the Berne Convention applied in Common Law Countries? 
The Berne Convention has a wide scope and purports to apply to almost any field of 
creative endeavour. The way in which it is implemented varies greatly. The Convention 
does not require that a separate statute be introduced to implement moral rights. For 
68 Above n 67, at 578 ff 
69 
The Paris Convention for the Protection oflndu trial Property, 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305. 
70 
The International Convention for U1e Protecti on of Perfonncrs, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations, 496, UNTS 43. 
7 1 28 JLM 1477 (1 989). 
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,.. ) 
years common law countries claimed that consumer protection statutes and common law 
doctrines such as passing off and defamation provide sufficient protection. After a 
reluctant start, common law jurisdictions now accept that there is a need for moral rights 
protection beyond the scope of the common law protections. The question remaining is 
just how far this protection should extend. There is a degree of latent protection in 
legislation and common law. Contract law provides another source of protection, but it 
primarily protects the author' s economic interests. In common law jurisdictions when 
copyright is assigned the contract will often express the extent to which the integrity 
right is within the influence of the creator of the work. Prior to the Rome Revision of the 
Berne Convention there was virtually no moral rights protection for artists in common 
law countries. Some protection was afforded artists in the form of the common law 
actions in the tort of passing off and defamation. There are criticisms of relying on tort 
for protection as it provides no protection after the death of the author.72 
1 What is wrong with the use of tort? 
The tort of passing off has been described as an example of common law evolving to 
indirectly protect the integrity rights of the creator. 73 Such protection is arguably more 
likely to be used by the copyright transferee than the author, and is focussed on the 
ultimate market effect rather than on the integral rights of the creator. To this extent the 
common law assumption that existing protection is sufficient is inherently flawed . The 
problem is approached in an indirect way and shirks a more comprehensive process of 
reform. Avoiding cost and delay may be a laudable aim, but should not be used as an all 
embracing justification for ignoring issues that need to be dealt with. 
Tort fails to safeguard the potential reputation of a developing artist who has yet to 
achieve fame. It is possible for an author to suffer detriment without damage to their 
reputation. The expression of the author' s work or their integrity as a creator may be 
72 ·n1is is a result of a compromise reached at the Stockholm Convention 1967. 
73 Above n 7. Passing ofTprotects the goodwill in a business. 
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damaged . This situation is not caught by the requirement that the treatment must be 
prejudicial to their honour or reputation. For example, if a gallery owner purchased an 
artist ' s works and proceeded to air brush the paintings the artist may well have the 
sympathy of a public outraged at such a thoroughly tasteless mutilation. The artist's 
reputation may not be prejudiced, but there is damage to the integrity of the work itself, 
and by extension to the artist. 
The right of integrity protects the author' s econorruc interests to the extent that a 
distorted work may damage the author' s reputation.74 The right to integrity also protects 
the link between the author and the work in question. Any action that affects the work, 
by implication also affects the author. There is a social benefit in protecting the author' s 
integrity in works. By doing so we also protect the value of our cultural heritage.75 
Moral rights extend beyond the realm of author protection, to serve as a form of "truth in 
marketing legislation". 76 This enables the public to receive the work in the form that it was 
intended to be received by the public.77 The precondition that there be damage prejudicial 
to the honour or reputation of the artist is justified as a floodgate against the potential 
flood of moral rights claims from aggrieved creators. France, Germany and Canada have 
had moral rights regimes for some time and there has been no evidence to suggest that a 
flood of litigation has resulted from the implementation of moral rights. This formulation 
confuses common law defamation with moral rights. This is not optimal as an action in 
defamation usually seeks damages as recompense for infringement. This does nothing 
proactive to prevent damage to the author' s reputation. Given that moral rights differ in 
many ways from the tort of defamation, it is not valid to import the same considerations 
directly across. It seems that this is just another example of common law countries 
attempting to fit moral rights into existing jurisprudential holes, rather than developing a 
fresh body of jurisprudence. 
74 
D Tan ''Seeing Red over Stravinsky's Firebird" ( l 996) 7 lntellectual Property Journal 63 , at 65 . 
75 
Merryman states that: "To revise, censor or to improve the work of art i to falsify a piece of culture" I.II 
Merryman "The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet" ( 1976) 27 Ila tings Law Journal 1023 , at I 041. 
76 Above n 8, at 319. 
77 
D. Vaver "Authors' Moral Rights and the Copyright Law Review Committee 's Report: W(h)ither such Rights 
Now?" (1 988) 14 Monash Law Review 284 at 287. 
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V Moral Rights and Common Law 
A Infancy and Evolution 
The common law system does not provide us with an impressive body of law relating to 
moral rights . Initially it was denied that such a right existed at law. In Shostakovic v 
Twentieth Century Fox him Corp Ltd the plaintiffs' music was used in such a way as to 
cast the Soviet Union in a bad light. 78 The musicians argued that the use of their music 
implied that they approved of the content of the film. This violated their right of non 
attribution. The case failed in the United States where the Court refused to hold that 
such a right existed, but succeeded in France where moral rights were more 
established.79 
John Lennon in Big Seven Music v lennon claimed that the packaging of his record 
amounted to a mutilation of his work and thus violated his moral rights.8° Former Beatie 
George Harrison brought an action against a record company that planned to create a 
tape compiled from interviews recorded fifteen years previously, interspersed with 
Beatles music. 81 Polydor had the copyright in the interviews and was licensed to use the 
recordings of the Beatles music. The Beatles attempted to stop the recordings from being 
released on the grounds that it would be prejudicial to their reputation as their views had 
changed substantially since that time. The United States court refused to uphold the 
Beatle' s action . 
The law has evolved to the point where moral rights are being recognised in various guises 
and aliases, within the existing system. In more recent times there has been a swing in 
favour of upholding moral rights. George Michael and his record company took action 
78 80 NYS 2d 575 (1948). 
79 Soc le Chant de Monde v Twentieth C'entwy Fox [1 953] DA J 954, 16 . 
80 554 F2d 504 (2d Cir 1977). 
81 I larrison and Starkey v Polydor I l 977] FSR 1 
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against BMG Records who were attempting to release a compilation using samples from 
George Michael ' s work "Bad Boys". 82 The copyright owner Morrison Leahy Music Ltd 
took action on the grounds of infringement of copyright by an unauthorised adaptation of 
its copyright work. George Michael alleged breach of the right of integrity, claiming that 
BMG' s recording was a derogatory treatment of his work. The Court was prepared to 
grant an injunction preventing the release of the work, saying that the plaintiffs had an 
arguable case on the grounds. 
In the space of forty years there has been a gradual move towards the acceptance of moral 
rights. At the time that John Lennon and George Harrison attempted to use moral rights 
arguments, these rights were not legally recognised. The demand for moral rights has been 
the horse drawing the legislative cart. The approaches vary through the various 
jurisdictions. The United States chose to adopt limited sui generis legislation, Canada has 
strengthened pre existing moral rights, and Australia is in the process of reform. The New 
Zealand Copyright Act 1994 closely mirrors the United Kingdom Copyright, Design and 
Patents Act and its concomitant deficiencies. 
B United States 
The United States was late acceding to the Berne Convention. 83 In implementing the 
Convention the United States favoured a minimalist approach and spurned a major rehaul 
of their copyright law. American inaction with regard to the implementation of the 
principles of Art 6bis was defended by a comparison with other Berne Convention 
countries whose legislation did not comply with Art 6bis. Legislation was enacted to the 
effect that the United States legislation existing on the date of implementation of the Berne 
Convention was sufficient to satisfy the United States obligation under Art 6bis. 
82 Morrison Leahy Music Ud v Ughtbond Ltd Unreported, I Iigh Court of Justice, UK, March 1991. 
83 The United States acceded to the Berne Convention in 1988. 
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Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States Copyright Act does not purport to 
extinguish common law copyright. 84 There could be scope to argue on the basis of 
common law copyright, which would include moral rights. 85 Arguments may be made on 
the right to claim attribution and to object to distortion, mutilation., modification or any 
other derogatory treatment. 86 
1 Pre accession to the Berne Convention 
Courts in the United States have long been reluctant to recognise the existence of moral 
rights. In Crimi v Rutgers Presbyterian Church the Court refused to uphold an artist's 
claim that his mural (which had been painted over) should be restored or removed at the 
expense of the Church who had not commissioned it in the first instance. 87 The Court held 
that moral rights did not exist at law. However, some arguments similar to moral rights 
were made before courts throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Protection was 
granted in Neyland v Home Pattern Co where an embroidery pattern of the plaintiff's 
work was published and attributed to him. 88 Neyland complained that this was a misuse of 
his work and name. The action was held to be a violation of his personal rights under 
section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. Protection analogous to moral rights 
protection was granted by means of tort, contract and unfair competition law.89 
Moral rights have resurfaced. The Monty Python team has left its mark on American 
copyright law. Monty Python successfully brought an action against ABC claiming that 
their moral right had been infringed by advertisements interrupting their show. The action 
succeeded under the guise of the Lanham Act. 90 Terry Gilliam has kept up the tradition. 
84 Donaldson v Beckel/ 4 Burr. 2408 settled in the UK that the Statute of Anne extinguishes and replaces the 
common law of copyright. 
85 See§ 101 Berne Convention (2XbXi) and (i i). 
86 See Appendix 3. The right of disclosure as in 0U1er common law countries, is fairly \\ ell recogni ed. Solinger v 
Random House above n 13 , is an example of how this right has been applied. 
87 89 NYS 2d 81 3 (Supreme Court 1949). 
88 65 F 2d 363 (2nd Cir. 1933). 
89 Granz v Harris 198 F 2d 585 (2nd Circuit, 1952). 
90 TI1e Lanham Act is similar to the New Zealand Fair Trading Act l 986. 
The "Brazil" case represents the development of a body of law relating to moral rights in 
the United States. Terry Gilliam produced the film Brazil with the financial support of 
Sidney Sheinberg, president and executive officer of MGM. The film was completed 
within budget and in time but Sheinberg wanted to cut the running time and alter the 
ending. Gilliam argued that impacted on his moral rights as director and author of the film. 
During the course of filming Universal compelled Gilliam to sign a contractual variation 
which rescinded previous oral assurances and allowed the film to be cut. To encourage 
compliance half the film ' s budget was withheld. The variation reluctantly agreed to was 
that Gilliam would lose the right to the director' s final cut if the film exceeded the 125 
minute maximum. Gilliam steadfastly maintained that the film ' s integrity and ending were 
non negotiable. By signing the variation Gilliam lost the contractual right to the final cut 
and was made subject to the terms of a gagging order. A public and acrimonious dispute 
ensued and Gilliam' s plight struck the chords of the public' s heart. Universal came under 
considerable criticism and the resulting adverse publicity ensured that Gilliam' s rights were 
respected. 
This example highlights the problems inherent in the United States copyright law. Contract 
and property rights are favoured above moral rights, which are conceived of as more of a 
personality right. Recognition is focussed on the author' s right of economic exploitation, 
ignoring the personal and creative link of the artist with his work. 
2 Federal approach 
In the United States debate raged as to how moral rights could be incorporated into law 
whilst requiring as little change as possible. Moral rights were opposed on a number of 
grounds. Mora] rights appear to be disconsonent with the principles underlying American 
copyright and trademark legislation.9 1 The United States regime favours the 
dissemination of knowledge for the public benefit. It was thought that increased 
protection for creators would deter economic investment in the arts, and lead to cultural 
91 The United States Copyright /\et purports to favour Lhe progress of science and Lhe useful arts. Jeremy Waldron 
enlarges on the meaning of this in ''From Aulhors to Copiers" ( 1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 84 1. 
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conservatism.92 The latter charge would only be applicable in situations where there is a 
requirement that the work be "of recognised stature"93 Such a precondition necessarily 
calls for the court to make a value judgment about the creative merits of the work. This 
is paradoxical, given that in the more established realms of copyright law, judges are 
loath to make an assessment of the artistic merit of the work. 
3 LanhaniActandtorts 
The United States has used elements of the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act to 
protect aspects of intellectual property. The acts are designed to operate in a socially 
beneficial way, favouring societal interests to a greater extent than the rights of the 
creator. The Lanham Act operates as a form of consumer truth protection. The Lanham 
Act has been used by courts to protect the right of attribution and the right of integrity. 94 
Protection only applies if the creator has contracted to retain the right to assert their 
integrity rights against the copyright transferee. The tort of defamation has been used to 
prevent false attribution. 95 Dane Ciolino expresses concern about the adequacy of relying 
on tort for moral rights protection.96 
4 Visual Artists' Rights Act (VARA) 
The United States introduced the Visual Artists Rights Act in 1990 to atone for the 
failure to enact legislation in accordance with Art 6bis. 97 The Act bestows the rights of 
92 D.Ciolino "Mora] llights and Real Obligations: A Property Law Framework for the Protection of Author's Moral 
Rights" (1995) 69 Tulane Law Review 935 , at 957. 
93 Section 106A Visual Artists Rights Act 1990 (VARA). ·n1e State legislation of California, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts and Permsylvania also have such a requirement. This operates so as to protect only established 
artists. 
94 See Gilliam v American Broadcasting Co 538 F 2d 14 (2d Cir 1976) ,\here the Court was prepared to recognise 
the right of integrity as falling within the scope of the Lanham Act. At the same time the Court acknowledged that 
American copyright law does not protect artist's moral rights. See also L.L. Van Velzen "Injecting Duty Into Droit 
Moral" (1988-89) 74 lowa Law Review 629, at 643. 
95 Edison v Viva International Ltd 421 NYS 2d 203, (S Ct 1979). 
96 Sec above n 92 , at 952 and discussion entitled ''Wliat is Wrong Willi the Use ofTortT 
97 For a discussion ofU1e VARA sec M. Weir "111e Story of Moral Rights or the Moral to U1e Story" ( 1992) 3 
Australian Intellectual Property Journal 232, al 246. 
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correct attribution and integrity upon the creators of visual arts. The right of integrity 
generally only applies where there has been a derogatory treatment of the work, which is 
prejudicial to the artist's honour or reputation. The right to integrity prevents the 
mutilation, destruction or distortion of works as well as protecting against wilful or 
negligent destruction by neglect of a work of recognised stature. The inclusion of 
detrimental treatment by neglect is a noteworthy development. This allows inaction on 
the part of the owner of the work to be prosecuted. In other jurisdictions there is no duty 
to maintain the work98 
Perhaps the biggest deficiency in the federal approach to moral rights protection is the 
limited scope of its application. 99 Authors of literary, dramatic and musical works do not 
fall within the ambit of the Act. Works of art in commerce and works made for hire are 
excluded from the category of visual works for the purposes of the Act. 100 The exclusion 
of works made for commerce denies a financially lucrative and easily exploited category 
of works, the protection of the Act. It is not logical to assume that any the less creative 
input goes into a work created on commission. A mitigating factor is that blanket 
waivers of authors' rights are not permitted. An author can negotiate and agree to a 
waiver. VARA is effectively a form of legislative contractual regulation, and focuses less 
on author's rights than it does on safeguarding the purchaser's investment in the work. It 
ignores the lucrative literary and film markets. The reaction to overall efficacy of VARA 
is mixed. Jane Ginsburg takes a cautiously optimistic approach to the Act. Her expressed 
hope is that: 101 
98 In the United Kingdom there is no uch duty to maintain. 
99 
For an outline of state and federal arts legislation see JA Frazier "On Moral Rights, Artist-Centered Legislation, 
and the Role of the State in Art Worlds:Notes to Building a Sociology of Copyright Law'' ( 1994) 70 Tulane Law 
Review 313. 
JOO For a full discussion oft11c "works made for hire" argument see "Works-Made-For-Tlire' I\ Round Table 
Discussion" (1990) 14 Columbia VL/\ Journal of Law & t11e Arts. 507. 
1 
OJ .I.Ginsburg "Copyright in ilie l O I st Congress: Commentary on ilie Visual Artists Rights /\et and t11e Architectural 
Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990" (1990) 14 Columbia VLA Journal of Law & the Arts 477, at 497. 
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[ ... ] one may hope that the Visual Artists Rights Act affords a first, rather than a last, step 
towards evolving more generalised guarantees of the rights of attribution and integrity of creators 
of original works of authorship. 
5 State solutions to the moral rights dilemma 
While the United States debated the moral rights issue, several states proceeded with sui 
generis moral rights legislation for fine art. These statutes grant the rights of integrity and 
attribution. Some provide specifically for protection against destruction, but it is uncertain 
in many jurisdictions whether there is protection against total destruction as opposed to 
mutilation. In deciding only to protect a limited category of work, states have made an 
assessment about the types of works that they think society does or should value. 102 For a 
work to be protected there is usually a requirement that the work be of recognised 
quality.103 Darnich points out that whereas most copyright protection proceeds on the 
basis that everything is protected and then limits the scope, these statutes start from a 
narrow point, assuming that only certain types of work will be protected. States are more 
likely to provide protection where the work has been publicly displayed. It is questionable 
whether there is a logical rationale for curtailing the right of attribution with respect to art 
held in private collections. Although privacy issues are involved, this is to be weighed 
against the fact that it is relatively cheap and easy to attribute a work. 104 
Most states have created a sensible requirement with respect to the negative right of 
attribution. If an author wants to disassociate themselves from a work, they must have a 
valid reason for doing so. This is intended to prevent the situation where an artist refutes 
attribution unless a substantial sum is paid.105 In New York the artist has a positive right 
of attribution and can prevent a work from being attributed to them if it has been 
102 See generally E .J. Dam.ich "St.ate Moral Rights St.a lutes: An Analysis and Criliqui:" ( 1989) 13 Columbia VLA 
Journal of Law & the Arts 291, al 297. 
103 Dam.ich above n I 02 cites Cal s 987(b x2 ); La SS 2152( 4) and (7) and NM s 13-4 B-2, as examples of this 
requirement. 
I04 Above n 102 at 309. 
IOS /\lU10ugh from the artist's point of view this would create a very effective de facto droit de suite regime. 
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damaged, altered or defaced . However, if false attribution is alleged, the artist must prove 
that this results in a reasonable likelihood of damage to their reputation 
Moral rights exist to protect and preserve the link between the artist and their work. 
Whether or not the public' s perception of the artist is altered as a result of the mutilation is 
of no direct import, and confuses the distinction between moral rights and tort. It can also 
be argued that destruction of a work of art amounts to damage to the reputation of the 
artist, but most regimes do not deal with this issue. Removal of art from a site is not a 
breach of the right of integrity. However, several states provide that if a work is to be 
removed from a building the creator should be notified of the fact and given the 
opportunity to remove the work themselves.106 In New York there is a positive duty to 
maintain works of art. In California there is no duty to maintain the art work, but person 
may not intentionally destroy, deface, mutilate or alter a work. Conservation measures 
taken in good faith will not attract liability. Acts of gross negligence are deemed by some 
legislatures to be worthy of punishment. Liability for violation of an integrity right only 
attaches where there is knowledge or intent. 107 The Berne Convention does not require 
knowledge or intention. This requirement is problematic as it erodes the scant protection 
granted to the artist. 108 By focussing on the wrongdoers intent it ignores both the damage 
to the work and the artist, which is the proper focus of moral rights. A system which 
focuses on the requisite standard of care would be more equitable 
The fact that states felt the need to enact moral rights legislation pnor to federal 
legislation indicates a perceived need . However, neither state nor federal legislatures 
were prepared to expand the scope of moral rights any further than was necessary. The 
legislation is limited in application and in scope, and is tied to concepts of tort, rather 
than seeking to evolve a body of moral rights jurisprudence. 
l OG Pennsylvania, California, Connecticut, Louisiana and New Mexico all have provisions relating to the removal of 
art from buildings. 
I O? New York and California prescribe liabi lity in such cases. 
l08 California, Massachusetts and New Mexico hold that gross negligence in restoration or conservation attracts 
liability. 
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C Canada 
Canada was the first common law signatory to enact specific legislation dealing with 
moral rights provisions. 109 Its copyright regime is an amalgam of common law and civil 
law principles Provisions have purportedly been strengthened to make integrity rights 
more readily enforceable in cases of distortion, mutilation or damage to reputation. 
Prejudice to honour and reputation is presumed where there is an unauthorised 
modification to works of fine art. 110 Steps taken to preserve the work are not regarded as 
modifications or damage to the integrity rights. Changes in location or negative space, in 
the absence of any other factors are not regarded as a distortion or mutilation of the 
work according to the provisions Canadian Copyright Act. This is arguably 
unsatisfactory. 111 Canadian commentator, Mark Rudoff points out that moral rights 
should go beyond merely protecting the economic value of the work 11 2 
At the next level, integrity rights acknowledge that an intimate bond exists between a creator and 
his creation. 
RudofPs thesis is that moral rights, particularly integrity rights, serve to protect society's 
interest in the preservation of art in the form that the creator intended it to be seen. He 
argues that the best, albeit rather indirect way to protect an artist's economic interest in a 
work is to grant the fullest protection possible to the artist's connection to the work. 113 It 
must however, be acknowledged that an overly broad interpretation of the right to 
integrity could lead to a result that is unworkable in practice. 
109 Moral rights were first enacted in 193 1. 
l l O For example paintings, sculpture or engravings. 
11 1 Where the work of art is a sculpture, to change the location of the work could be to change the work itself. A rt 
does not exist in a vacuum, but rather in a context. 
11 2 M.L. Rudo IT "The Dancer and the Dance" ( 1991) 29 Alberta l ,aw Review 884, at 886. 
113 Above n 112 at 887. 
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The Canadian legislation allows waivers, a move criticised by Professor Vaver. 114 A 
concern expressed was that the right of paternity would have to be able to be waived to 
enable ghostwriters to fall within the scheme of the Act. 115 The right of paternity is 
waivable if it is reasonable to do so in the circumstances. 116 This is arguably contrary to 
the Berne Convention. 117 A question remaining is whether the public interest recognised 
in the legislation should be vulnerable to private contractual provisions. The effectiveness 
of the Canadian provisions is called into question by existence of the waiver provisions. 
As one commentator has remarked, 118 
In the end, all that the new moral rights provisions may have accomplished is the insertion of an 
e>..'tra paragraph in the transfer and sale agreement between the purchaser and the artist. 
D United Kingdom 
The Whitford Committee convened to reform the Copyright Act, concluded that the law 
was not meeting the obligations imposed by Art 6bis of the Berne Convention. Moral 
rights provisions were recommended . The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(CDP A) includes provisions aimed at conforming with Art 6bis. 
The right of disclosure is protected by Act and by the doctrine of breach of 
confidence. 119 The author has the right to be the first person to put the work into 
circulation. 12° Copyright is infringed if the defendant puts copies of the work into 
114 D. Vaver "Authors' Moral Rights in Canada: Charter or Darter of Rights for Creators?" ( 1987) 25 Osgoode IIall 
Law Journal 749, at 771 ff 
115 See R.D. Gibbens "The Moral Right of Artists and the Copyright Act Amendments'' ( 1989) 15 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 441 , at 467. 
l 16 S 12(]) Canadian Copyright Act J 985. 
117 A similar proposal was mooted in the United Kingdom but was rejected as the Committee felt that it was a 
deviation from the principles underlying the Berne Convention. For a general discussion ofU1e UK Act see R. 
Merkin Richards Butler on Copyright, Designs and Patents Butterwortl1s, London, 1989, at 234 ff 
118 Above n 115. 
119 Prince Albert v Strange ( 1849) l M & G 25 dealt with a situation where private etchings by Prince Albert were 
obtained by an unlawful act, and published. Breach of confidence was used to restrain U1c publication of U1c 
etchings. 
120 S 18(1) CDPA 
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circulation without the pennission of the copyright owner. The Committee originally 
concluded that a positive right of attribution would not be desirable, as this could create 
difficulties in the case of authors of composite works. The resulting legislation purports 
to accord the author full rights of attribution. 12 1 The author has the right to be identified 
as the author of the work. Authors are protected against false attribution and have the 
right to decide when to release the work to the public. 122 Artists have protection against 
the unauthorised alteration of artists ' work and the fraudulent affixation of signatures. 123 
Rights are not infringed unless they have been asserted in accordance with section 78 of 
the Act. The requirement of assertion indicates that some of the initial hesitancy to grant 
attribution rights remains. Furthermore, as in New Zealand, the court can take into 
account the delay in asserting the right when assessing damages. 124 Personal assertion is 
required, if the assertion is made in an assignment of copyright there must be a statement 
to that effect. An assertion can be made by a written instrument signed by the person 
asserting the right. 125 The right of attribution only applies where the work is published 
commercially, broadcast or perfonned in public, included in a cable programme or if the 
work is a film or sound recording and is issued to the public.126 
Integrity rights do not extend to prevent the relocation of a work or protect the physical 
manner in which the work is displayed .127 The right to object to derogatory treatment 
does not protect against complete destruction.128 There is no obligation to keep the work 
in a fit state of repair. The copyright owner can treat the work with impunity as long as 
the conduct falls outside the definition of derogatory treatment. The rights of integrity 
12 1 For a discussion of the reform process seeMerkin above n 11 7, at 234. 
122 See Doyle v Wright (1928-35) MCC 243 and Gilbert v Star Newspaper Co (1894) 11 TLR 4. 
123 S 84 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988 
124s 78(5) CDPA 1988. 
125 s 78(2Xb). 
126 This provision is paralleled in U1e New Zea land Copyright Act 1994. 
127 See farther di scussion on the concept of relocation and negative space. 
128This is a common feature in common law j urisdictions .. 
and paternity do not apply to computer programs and news reporting. 129 The Act allows 
for the editing of works in the interests of good taste and public welfare. 
The rights in the United Kingdom Act last for life plus fifty years in the case of works, and 
for fifty years for film . Moral rights are not assignable inter vivos but can be made the 
subject of testamentary disposition.130 The rights of paternity, integrity and privacy with 
regard to photos and films can accompany testamentary disposition.131 In such absence the 
right can be exercised by the personal representative of the author. Contractual rights and 
integrity rights often operate in parallel enabling the author to seek redress either by 
relying on the specific terms of the contract or on the more general integrity rights. An 
author can consent to acts which would otherwise be an infiingement of moral rights and 
can waive the rights. Waiver may be formal or informal. The existence broad waiver 
clauses could effectively means that authors' moral rights will seldom be enforced. 
Criticisms of the United Kingdom Act mirror those of the New Zealand Copyright Act. 
The requirement that the right of attribution be asserted, the uncertainty relating to the 
scope of the integrity right, and the broad approach to waiver provisions are diminish the 
scope of moral rights. 
E Australia:Process of Reform 
Australia' s approach to moral rights has been cautious. In reviewing the Copyright Act 
the Copyright Review Committee, unlike the Whitford Committee, concluded that there 
was insufficient abuse of moral rights to warrant statutory intervention. 132 The 
Committee voted 5 to 4 against the incorporation of moral rights in Australia' s 
129 S 79 CDPA 1988. 
13o S 94, 95 CDPJ\ 1988. 
131 S 95 CDPA 1988. 
132 Sec Vavcr above n 77, at 286. Sec also Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC) Discussion Paper Moral 
Rights 1984 and Report A fora/ Rights . 
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Copyright Act 1988. The existing protection provided by the law of passing off and 
unfair competition may protect the economic aspect of the author's rights. However, 
there is little protection against modification or derogatory treatment of the work. The 
Trade Practises Act and the Copyright Act protect integrity rights only to a limited 
extent. 133 In 1994 the Australian Attorney-General ' s department revived the debate by 
releasing a discussion paper on moral rights. The paper is not intended to reopen the 
debate on whether moral rights should be included in legislation, but aims to determine 
how they can best be incorporated. The stated aim is to develop a regime that : 134 
strikes a workable balance between the rights of copyright creators, the rights of users and 
producers of copyright material and the community generaJly. 
Australia's move towards recognition of moral rights was occasioned by a variety of 
considerations. Moral rights were a way of making Australia appear more responsive to 
international obligations under the GATT. They were also heavily promoted by pressure 
groups such as the Australian Society of Authors, the Australasian Performing Rights 
Association (APRA) and surprisingly enough the Australian Book Publishers' 
Association. Mr Justice Sheppard correctly commented that moral rights will act as a 
complement to economic rights to allow full protection for authors. 135 
Australia plans to implement the rights of attribution and integrity. The right of 
attribution will only extend to the positive right of attribution. The draft paper suggests 
granting authors a positive right of integrity against any "material distortion, mutilation 
or alteration" that is prejudicial to the author' s reputation or honour. Australia may have 
hoped that this formulation would enable moral rights to be grafted onto existing 
common law. 136 The prejudicial treatment requirement parallels other common law 
countries. In assessing the degree of infringement (the degree of prejudicial alteration, 
133 Sec S. Ricketson The Law of Intellectual Property Law 8ooJ... Company, Melbourne, 1984, at 43 1. 
134 Attorney-General ' s Department Discussion Paper , "Proposed Moral Rights Legislation for Copyright Creators" 
June 1994 , at 3. 
!35 Justice Sheppard "Moral Rights" [ l 994] Arts and Entertainment Law 11 at 2 1. 
136 For criticism of thi s point see comments in heading "What is Wrong Wi U1 ilie Use of Tort?" 
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mutilation or destruction) the court is called upon to make an assessment of the artistic 
worth of the plaintiff's work. The right of integrity may cause the most radical change to 
the law in Australia, as these rights have been relatively unprotected in law thus far. 
Issues relating to the rights of performing artists remain largely unresolved . In addition to 
protection for literary, artistic, musical and dramatic works, Australia will grant 
protection to films, sound recordings and broadcasts. The Berne Convention does not 
require protection for the latter three categories. It is assumed that in the case of film 
moral rights will rest with the producer of the film. 
The duration of moral rights causes concern. 137 Such difficulties can be set aside if the 
right to exercise moral rights is perceived as distinct from actually possessing the rights. 
Australia intends to limit the duration of moral rights to the same duration as economic 
rights. This is similar to the monist concept of moral rights. 138 If the rights are not 
specified to last beyond the death of the creator then they cease upon the creator's death. 
Formal waiver provisions are proposed to prevent moral rights being too onerous. This 
creates the risk that moral rights may exist on paper more than in reality. 139 Balanced 
against this is the concern that strict adherence to moral rights may create a system that 
is inflexible and unmanageable. Further it is also argued that an absence of formal waiver 
provisions could lead to a proliferation of unregulated under the counter waiver deals. 
Moral rights will be alienable. This contrasts with the French system where moral rights 
are perpetual and inalienable. The scope of the proposed rights is still uncertain . One 
approach would be to have a list of exceptions to the rights. The drawback is that this is 
inflexible. The other alternative is to allow the application of the rights to be subject to a 
test for reasonableness, as in Canada. The Australian Discussion Paper draws an analogy 
between the latter scheme and the present system for fair use, where reasonableness is 
judged in light of all the circumstances. 
137 Above n 8, at p 338. 
138 Where the economic and moral rights are interdcpcnda11t and expire together. 
139 Above n I I 5. 
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Australia has taken longer to decide to implement moral rights, but there has been more 
debate on the merits of various levels of protection. In spite of this the Australian 
proposals are lacking in several respects. By only allowing a positive right of attribution, 
the author is denied the means of defending unauthorised attribution, unless he can rely on 
consumer protection legislation.140 This abrogates a fundamental right of authorship. The 
requirement of prejudicial treatment limits the right of integrity to existing common law 
remedies. Concern about the waiver scheme is valid . This is intensified by the proposal 
that the rights be alienable. The deficiencies in the proposals are problems consistently 
found in the common law world . 
F New Zealand 
The Copyright Act introduced moral rights to New Zealand in 1994. The Act should 
have been well reasoned and coherent piece of legislation. Instead the legislation is to a 
large extent reliant on the United Kingdom's Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. There 
has been no litigation on the provisions, so most of the problems highlighted are 
speculative. It is difficult to tell the extent to which the problems are due to fundamental 
misconceptions about moral rights, and the extent to which poor drafting is at fault. 141 
The Act purports to grant the rights to attribution and integrity. An author must assert 
their moral rights, since the right to identification is not infringed: 142 
unless the right has been asserted under this section in such a way as to require that person to so 
identify the author or director. 
In an action for copyright infringement the court will take into account any delay in 
asserting the right of attribution. 143 The requirement that an author· must specifically 
140 Jf someone attributed a work to an author,which was not his, he would be unable to disassociate himsel f from the 
work wiUun U1e realms of U1e moral rights provisions. 
141 Cf s ll Copyright/\cl. See Appendix4. 
142 s 96. 
143 S 96(5). 
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assert their moral rights is incongruous, given that the economic aspects of copyright 
have no such corresponding onus. An unnamed author does not have to assert their 
rights to gain the benefit of fifty years copyright protection. Copyright comes into 
existence upon creation of the work. 144 The Departmental Report to the Select 
Committee on the Copyright Bill suggested that the requirement of assertion was 
inconsistent with the "spirit of informality" inherent in the Copyright Act.145 It could also 
be said to be inconsistent with Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention which states that the 
enjoyment and exercise of authors ' rights should not be subject to any formality. This 
raises the question as to why moral rights must be asserted. Copyright grants rights and 
an ability to exploit the work's commercial value. Moral rights, in principle are not tied to 
economic rights. There is less cost associated with giving effect to moral rights than 
there is in economic rights and yet there is a requirement of assertion. The requirement 
of assertion and commercial use of the work provides a loophole by which moral rights 
can be rendered less effective. 
The author of a literary or dramatic work has the right to be identified as the author 
when the work is first performed, broadcast or published commercially. 146 Composers of 
musical works are only accorded copyright protection when the work is commercially 
published or when copies are distributed to the public. The right of attribution follows 
publication in the case of artistic works. If copyright in a work first vested with the 
employer or with the director' s employer, the right of attribution (with a few provisos) is 
not applicable.147 The right does not apply in the case of collaborative literary, artistic or 
dramatic works where the authors were not previously identified in or on published 
copies of the work. Reflecting the Whitford Committee debate, the New Zealand Act 
demonstrates a reluctance to embrace the rights of authors in a collaborative work . 
144 S 22(3). 
145 Department of Justice "Copyright Bill :Departmental Report" 3 November 1994, at 110. 
146 S 94 (2). 
147 S 21 (2), s 5(2)(b). 
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There is a slight advantage over the Australian proposals which do not recognise the 
right to non attribution. The New Zealand legislature has given the widest protection to 
the right to object to incorrect attribution. The right to object to false attribution is not 
dissimilar to elements of the tort of passing off, or the protection granted by the Fair 
Trading Act. This may account for the broad protection granted in section 102. The right 
to object to false attribution does not require that there be commercial motivation. The 
right is infringed by a person who merely issues to the public copies of literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work or a film in which there is a false attribution. 
Treatment is derogatory if by distortion, mutilation or otherwise, it is prejudicial to the 
honour or reputation of the author or director. 148 The right is formulated in a positive 
sense.149 This provision does not apply to performing artists, to architectural designs for 
buildings or to where an alteration is carried out to maintain standards of decency or 
good taste. Derogatory treatment is only actionable if the work is made public. 150 The 
French approach has no precondition that the derogatory treatment be made public. In 
France the work is regarded as an extension of the author and derogatory treatment is 
prohibited even if it is not available to the public. An analysis of the New Zealand 
provision indicates that if a literary work were subjected to derogatory treatment, but 
was not published commercially, and was distributed to the public or made available, it 
would not fall within the rubric of the Act. 151 The definition of commercial publication 
contained in section 11 is problematic.152 The section focuses on the timing of the 
publication and may relate more to a copyright owner's right of disclosure. 153 It does not 
aid interpretation of section 99. Secondary infringement likewise requires that the 
infringement be carried out in the course of business.154 The rationale behind the New 
148 s 98. 
149 S 98(2). 
150 S 99 Copyright Act 1994, Appendix 4. 
151 Sec Appendix 4. 
152 See Appendix 4. 
153 Compare w ith s 18( I) CPDA 
154 S 99(6) (knowledge of derogatory treatment) 
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Zealand moral rights prov1s10ns appears to be linked to the exploitative value of the 
work. Making moral rights dependant on the author' s exploitative use of the work 
derogates from the fundamental precepts of moral rights whether defined as a personality 
right or a property right. It disproportionately impacts on the rights of the author, and 
too closely links the economic rights with moral rights. No discernible public purpose is 
served by such an approach. 
There is an underlying theme that a commercial element is required before the rights to 
positive attribution and integrity rights are triggered. There is a fundamental confusion 
between moral rights and economic rights, an analysis of approaches in other common 
law jurisdictions lends credence to this theory. This introduces a requirement which is 
not present in the European approach to moral rights. The basis for moral rights lies in 
the imputed connection between the creator and her work. The right is personal to the 
author and protects the integrity of the creator and his work. Even if we accept that the 
rights interdependent, this does not mean that they are one in the same, or that one 
deserves to be abrogated in favour of the other. 
The New Zealand Copyright Act focuses less on creators' moral rights than it does on 
publishers' rights.155 Moral rights may be waived, and there is almost an expectation that 
rights will be waived.156 This raises the question of which type of waiver system should be 
operated. The approach taken by the legislature has been to specify exceptions to the Act. 
It may be consistent if there were to be defined situations in which waiver is permissible. 
This would provide a degree of clarity. However it is conceivable that a less regulated 
waiver scheme could succeed and protect creators rights. This would however require the 
moderating influence of an organisation set up to mediate/negotiate waivers. This would 
155 In thi s respect the New 1/.,caland Acl is doctrinally similar to Wiichter ' s theory of the publi sher' s right This theory 
states that the essence of copyright lies in the rights that the author assigns to a publisher for conunercial 
exploitation of the work. TI1e main aim is for the auU10r to be able to prevent others from unauthorised use of 
his/her work. 0 . Wachter Das Verlagsrecltt mi/ Eischluss der Lehren vom T'erlagsvertrag u11d Nachdrnck nach den 
geltenden deutschen 1111d intemationalen Rechten tuttgart 1857/58 as cited in F. J Kase above n 58. 
156 A discussion at the Ministry of Commerce about neighbotui ng rights and moral rights highhghtcd this attitude. 
Exeptions have been created for authors of computer programs, articles for newspapers, maga?incs, periodicals or 
works for current events, or authors of works whose copyright subsists in the employer. 
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help to provide objectivity and would safeguard creators' interests. The organisation 
would act as a fiduciary for the creator. This could be combined with a domaine public 
payant system for ma,ximum efficiency. 157 
VI Alternatives 
A Developments in other Jurisdictions 
India and Israel copyright legislation based on the United Kingdom model. From this 
starting point the models diverge. Each country has modified the protection in such a way 
as to give increased rights to authors. 
In Mannu Bhandari v Kala Vikas Pictures the plaintiff, a writer agreed to allow the film 
director to adapt it for film.158 The film differed substantially from the novel and the 
author claimed that her right to integrity was violated and the novel mutilated and 
distorted by the film's interpretation. The trial judge dismissed the case on the basis that 
a poor film reflects badly only on the filmrnaker and not the author. On appeal the Court 
found that there was distortion and mutilation of the plaintiff's work. The contractual 
provisions were read in light of Indian moral rights provisions. The only modifications 
permissible were those necessary due to the constraints of a medium.159 The High Court 
held that the film could be released on certain conditions. The author's name could not 
be associated with the film or publicity and copyright in the work would be returned to 
her. The plaintiff agreed not to claim any interest or right in the film and not to contest 
the release of the film. 
157 See heading below "Domain public payant". 
158 [1987] AIR (Del ) 13 . 
159 Above n 158, at 19. 
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The Israeli decision in Qimron v Shanks caused dismay in the United States.160 The 
director of the Biblical Society published a forward to volume of photographs about the 
Dead Sea Scrolls. Professor John Strugnell, Professor Elisha Qimron and a team of 
researchers were responsible for translating and reconstructing the scrolls. A critical 
article in the Biblical Society publication attributed the research on the scrolls to 
Professor Strugnell and an unnamed "colleague". Professor Qimron sued for damages 
and an injunction, alleging that his copyright in the research on the Scrolls was wilfully 
infringed, and that publication without attribution violated his moral right. Israeli law 
takes a proactive approach to moral rights. The right to paternity provides that an 
author is entitled to be credited in the usual extent and manner for his creation. Unlike 
the United l(jngdom and New Zealand there is no requirement that the right of 
attribution be asserted. The Israeli approach is laudable in this respect. The Israeli court 
found for the plaintiff on both charges and issued an injunction and awarded substantial 
damages. 161 
These cases both show that a British based system of copyright can be adapted to reflect 
changing values. Both countries have placed value on the right of attribution, India in 
particular upholding the right not to have work attributed when it has been distorted and 
not allowing modification beyond that required by the constraints of a medium. These 
systems have made an effort to comprehend the values underlying moral rights and to 
give effect to them. 
B Domaine Public Payant 
The domaine public payant scheme could be considered for implementation in New 
Zealand.162 It would complement moral rights legislation. In Western copyright law the 
rights and monopolies granted by copyright are limited in duration. After this the work 
160 3 [5753-1 993] P.M.10 (D Jerusalem 1993). 
161Statutory damages of US $7,407, US $29,600 for mental distress and US $ 18,5 19 for solici tor 's costs. 
162 See generally Dr C. Mouchet "Problems of U1e ·'Domaine Public Payant" (1983) 8 Colwnbia VLJ\ Journal of Art 
ai1d U1e Law 137. 
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passes into the public domain and can be used for free . This makes it attractive to 
publishers and rental outlets. The concept of domaine public payant has existed for a long 
time. It is not common in common law countries, but has found root in Italy, Chile, 
Argentina, Mexico and the former USSR. Domaine public payant seeks a resource rental 
for the use of material in the public domain . The system is designed to prevent the use of 
public domain works in such a way that would prejudice their authenticity or identity. The 
fees collected are poured back into supporting the arts. Those who oppose this system 
argue that it extends the monopoly granted by copyright, acts as a disincentive to 
creativity and has the potential to act against "cultural freedom". 163 However, if the body 
administering the scheme included representatives elected by creators, fears of government 
capture could be allayed. 164 Proponents praise the support conferred on the arts by this 
system. 
Moral rights involve similar issues to cultural property protection. States recognise the 
value of protecting cultural items from mutilation or destruction. The system can help to 
preserve cultural property for future generations.165 Merryman highlights the importance 
of the protection of cultural property not in the interests of cultural nationalism, but 
cultural internationalism 166 Legislation and international conventions provide a framework 
for protection. 167 Moral rights help to preserve the integrity in the creator' s works and to 
safeguard their contribution to cultural heritage. 
Works which are in the public domain are cheaper and are favoured by publishers. Such 
books, plays and artworks are not cheaper by virtue of being in the public domain. The 
exploiters can capitalise on these works. In real terms, the public receives little value from 
163 See above n 162, at 138. 
164 Such a scheme was proposed in Norway. 
165 
For a comprehensive debate on the protection of cultural propert) via intellectual property regimes see J.H. 
Merryman "Two Ways ofTiunking about Cultural Property'' ( 1986) 80 American Jownal of International I,a\\ 83 1. 
166 
Above n J 65, at 846. See also J.H Merryman "llie Public Interest in Cultural Property" ( 1989) 77 Calfom ia Law 
Review 339. 
167 
Tiie Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict recognises that even in 
testing times, U1e protection of cultural property is still of importance. It is inlportant not j ust to protect one's own 
cultural heritage, but also to protect the cultural heritage of 0U1ers. May l 4 J 954, 111e llague. 
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the works being in the public domain . By creating a fee for the use of these works it 
balance is redressed, assisting current creators. Dr Carlos Mouchet puts the case for 
domaine public payant convincingly.168 Mouchet argues that the real beneficiaries of the 
public domain are not the public but publishers and producers. These people he argues, do 
not on the whole complain when the cost of raw materials such as paper, machinery or to 
a point labour, goes up. Yet when it is suggested that they should pay for the resource in 
which the actual value lies, there is more concern. 169 The public domain thus benefits the 
major user more than the individual user. 
An effective system would be retroactive and would include works already in the public 
domain. Any other system would require an arbitrary timeline to be drawn to decide which 
works should be included or excluded. The question of who is to benefit remains open for 
debate. Proposals centre around a similar range of options. Potential beneficiaries are the 
relatives of creators, creators societies and the State, the proportions in which they would 
benefit vary. The aim is to provide stimulus and reward for creativity, and to enable the 
state to encourage the arts. Mouchet suggests that the amount charged for the use of 
works in the public domain should not be high, and should reflect the charges levied by 
existing copyright/ performing artists' collection agencies. 
The domain public payant structure is well suited to safeguarding the moral rights 
interests of creators and cultural property. It could be a means of providing support and 
protection of cultural heritage and could provide the state with revenue for the arts, which 
would further the interests of all creators. Publishers would not be seriously affected by 
the charges levied. They can be absorbed and factored into production costs. For years the 
real costs has been hidden. Publishers have made free use of works in the public domain 
whilst at the same time not passing on the lower production costs to the consumer. 
168 Above n 162. 
169."[I]t is surprising that there arc people who are unwilling to pay for the u e of the real and irreplaceable raw 
material , which is what intellectual creation really is - without \\hich books would be piles of blank sheets, the 
stage would be empty, a gramophone record would be inert matter, and radio and television would merely serve to 
transmit news and advertising." Above n 162, at 139-140. 
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VII Conclusion 
Common Law countries clearly have difficulties with the concept of moral rights. This is 
reflected by the limited application accorded in some countries. In the United States they 
have been introduced in sui generis form. Canada gives broader scope and a good level 
of protection for integrity rights but allows broad waiver provisions. Jn the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand the scope purports to be wide, but the actual application is 
narrow. French law defines moral rights as a personality right. The German system 
allows them to also be defined as a property right, by virtue of the interrelationship 
between moral and economic rights. Common law is familiar with personality rights as 
expressed in tort and with property rights. Any of the justifications for either system of 
rights can be used to rationalise moral rights. 
New Zealand has created a hierarchy of rights which attempts to replicate existing 
common law remedies. Instead of recognising that a paradigm shift is necessary the 
legislature is only prepared to recognise rights to the extent that they parallel existing tort 
law concepts. New Zealand should draw on existing legal concepts to ease the 
implementation of moral rights, but should not attempt to crudely graft them onto 
existing structures, mindless of the concepts and justifications underlying moral rights. 
The rights of integrity in New Zealand are limited and are defined according to existing 
tort concepts. Requiring damage that is prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the 
author loses sight of the fact that it is the artist's link to the work rather than his reputation 
that is being protected. Again the public display requirement does little to protect the 
author's moral rights and focuses on reputational damage. The provisions mentioned 
should be amended so as to focus on the rights of the creator. 
There will be circumstances in which it is necessary to curtail moral rights. This returns us 
to the question of who should bear the cost of moral rights. Waiver provisions redistribute 
the onus. The balance of the load should be distributed between the parties. In the current 
New Zealand climate, waiver provisions appear to be the solution most likely to find 
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acceptance. Waiver provisions should be tightened. There should be a change of emphasis. 
Rather than starting from the assumption that there will be a blanket, we should start from 
the assumption that there is no automatic waiver. The parties should be able to bargain in 
a regulated fashion . Waivers should be negotiated when there is a proposed transfer of the 
economic rights. The bargain should not be conditional on the waiver of the moral rights. 
The contract should stipulate with due particularity the types of rights that are being 
waived and the purpose(s) for which this is done (a purpose-for-grant approach). This 
would help to prevent an overly general and extensive disposition of the author' s rights. 
There is scope for creators' organisations to become involved in negotiating contracts and 
monitoring the use of waiver provisions. The German system of copyright protection 
makes extensive use of collecting societies. Already APRA is beginning to make its 
presence felt. Droit de suite could help achieve better parity of bargaining power between 
authors and exploiters. 
A domaine public payant system should be considered. The main reason why it was not 
implemented earlier was fear of a scheme with the potential for cultural capture.170 New 
Zealand does not have this historical baggage. We are seeking ways to protect cultural 
property. This could create revenue and protect moral rights and the use of cultural 
property. 
Moral rights and economic rights are frequently viewed as irreconcilable. Moral rights are 
perceived as being an obstacle in the headlong rush towards progress. Bolstering the 
author' s position by recognising broad rights is an alien concept to the captain at the helm 
of a publishing firm. However moral and economic rights can co-exist in a productive and 
economically viable environment. 171 The main stumbling block is the negative 
preconceptions about a predominantly French conception of moral rights, and the common 
law reaction : broad waiver provisions. To remedy this requires a shift away from the 
French notion of moral rights. By redefining and justifying moral rights a more equitable 
situation for all can be reached. 
170 
'n1is must be understood against U1c background and afl ennaUi of World War Two. 
17 1 France, Germany, The Ncilicrlands. 
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Appendix 1 
Article 6his Berne Convention 
1. Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said 
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to 
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation 
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation . 
Appendix 2 
German Copyright Act 1965 
1. General 
§ 11 
Copyright shall protect the author with respect to his intellectual and personal relations 
to the work, and also with respect to the utilisation of the work. 
2. Moral Rights C?f the Author 
§ 12. The Right of Dissemination 
(1) The author shall have the right to determine whether and how his work is to be 
disseminated . 
(2) The right of publicly communicating the contents of his work or a description thereof 
is reserved to the author, provided that neither the work, nor its essence, nor a 
description thereof has previously been disseminated with his consent. 
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§ 13 Recognition of Authorship 
The author shall have the right of recognition of his authorship of the work. He can 
determine whether the work is to bear an author 's designation and what designation is to 
be used. 
§ 14 Distortion of the Work 
The author shall have the right to prohibit any distortion or other mutilation of his work 
which would prejudice his lawful intellectual or personal interest in the work. 
Appendix 3 
§ 101 United States Code Annotated Title 17 Copyrights (Copyright Act 1976) 
(b) Certain Rights Not Affected 
The provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto, and 
satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of 
an author of a work, whether claimed under Federal, State, or the common law -
"(l) to claim authorship of the work; 
or 
"(2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to, the work, that would prejudice the author' s honour or reputation." 
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Appendix 4 
New Zealand Copyright Act I 994 
Section 11 provides: 
In this Act the term "commercial publication", in relation to a literary , dramatic, musical, 
or artistic work, means the publication of the work consisting of-
(a) Issuing copies of the work to the public at a time when copies made in advance of the 
receipt of orders are generally available to the public; or 
(b) Making the work available to the public by means of an electronic retrieval system:-
and related expressions shall be construed accordingly. 
Section 94 (I) of the Copyright Act provides: 
Subject to section 97 of this Act,-
(a) The author of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work that is a copyright work 
has the right to be identified as the author of the work; and 
(b) The director of a film that is a copyright work has the right to be identified as the 
director of the work, -
in the circumstances described in this section, but the right is not infringed unless it has 
been asserted in accordance with section 96 of this Act. 
Section 99(1) provides 
s 99(1) [Literary, dramatic, musical work] In the case of a literary, dramatic or musical 
work, the right conferred bys 98(2) of this Act is infringed by a person who-
( a) Publishes commercially, performs in public, broadcasts, or includes m a cable 
programme a derogatory treatment of the work; or 
(b) Issues to the public copies of -
(i) A film or sound recording of; or 
(ii) A film or sound recording that includes -
a derogatory treatment of the work. 
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